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Hiding in Plain Language: A Solution to
the Pandemic Riddle of a Suspended
Grand Jury, an Expiring Statute of
Limitations, and the Fifth Amendment
NICOLE D. MARIANI *
Under the statute of limitations applicable to most federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), “no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless
the indictment is found or the information is instituted within
five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” That long-standing, generally uncontroversial procedural statute was thrust into the spotlight in 2020, when
courts, prosecutors, and criminal defendants confronted an
unprecedented and extraordinary scenario.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many federal
district courts suspended grand juries to prevent the spread
of the highly contagious life-threatening virus through group
congregation. Indeed, to combat the rampant and unabating
COVID-19 outbreak in Florida, the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida suspended grand juries from
March 26, 2020, until November 17, 2020, creating a nearly
eight-month period during which prosecutors could not obtain indictments. But, under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, criminal defendants have the
right to be prosecuted by indictment. Thus, during the grand
Assistant United States Attorney in the Appellate Division of the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and Adjunct Professor of Legal Writing at the University of Miami School of Law; J.D., cum laude,
Harvard Law School; B.S., summa cum laude, Cornell University. The opinions
expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the United
States Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, the University of Miami
School of Law, or anyone else.
*
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jury suspension, the five-year statute of limitations applicable to most federal crimes was expiring on uncharged criminal conduct that ended in 2015 at a time when prosecutors
could not comply with the Fifth Amendment. Despite being
alerted of this constitutional issue, Congress did not enact
legislation giving either the Chief Judge of the United States
Supreme Court or the Chief Judges of the United States District Courts authority to suspend statutes of limitations during national emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic,
that affect the functioning of the courts. The combination of
that judicial decision to suspend grand juries and that legislative decision not to suspend statutes of limitations posed a
pandemic riddle: how can prosecutors comply with both the
statutes of limitations and the Fifth Amendment when there
are no grand juries?
This Article examines the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a),
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3288 and 3289; the purposes of statutes of limitations and
the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment; and
the related legislative history. Based on that examination,
this Article suggests that, for most federal crimes, when defendants assert their Fifth Amendment right to prosecution
by indictment during a pandemic (or other national emergency) that suspended grand juries and the statute of limitations on their alleged crimes is expiring, prosecutors can uphold that constitutional right and that statutory privilege as
well as the public interest in seeing lawbreakers brought to
justice by: (1) filing an information to toll the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); (2) dismissing that information without prejudice under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(a) if the defendant does not waive his right to
prosecution by indictment; and (3) obtaining a timely indictment within six months of the resumption of grand juries under the savings clauses in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289 for
re-prosecutions after the dismissal of a timely filed information. This Article concludes that there already is a mechanism in the federal statute of limitations appliable to most
federal crimes that allows prosecutors to constitutionally
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preserve criminal charges when a national emergency prevents grand juries from finding indictments.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, COVID-19 compelled humanity to re-examine the way
it did nearly everything, forcing difficult choices between competing values and creative solutions at every turn. The American criminal justice system was no exception. The standard procedures for
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enforcing the criminal laws and protecting constitutional rights and
statutory privileges were suddenly fraught with lethality. Thus,
courts, prosecutors, and criminal defendants had to re-examine longused statutes and rules for potential flexibility and alternative procedures to balance the individual rights enshrined in the Constitution
and the individual privileges created by Congress in its statutes
against the communal need for health and safety during an unprecedented and unexpected years-long global pandemic. 1
For example, the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to be prosecuted by
indictment, meaning they can be brought to trial on federal criminal
charges only if at least twelve grand jurors agree that the charges
alleged by the prosecutor are supported by probable cause. 2 To protect that right, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) mandates
that the federal government prosecute felonies by indictment—and
cannot prosecute felonies by information—unless the defendant
knowingly waives his right to prosecution by indictment. 3 As a result of that constitutional right and its strict implementing procedure,
the United States usually prosecutes defendants by indictment and
usually files an information only if the defendant first indicates that
he will waive his right to prosecution by indictment. 4
COVID-19, however, made adhering to that standard procedure
impossible. In March 2020, to control the spread of that terrifying
virus, federal, state, and local governments prohibited public gatherings. 5 In alignment with that necessary response, many federal
As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, U.S. Courts
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/02/18/pandemic-lingerscourts-lean-virtual-technology.
2
U.S. CONST. amend V. To find an indictment against a defendant, at least
twelve members of a sixteen-to-twenty-three-person grand jury, after hearing evidence presented by the prosecutor and deliberating as a group, must agree that
the charges are supported by probable cause. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
3
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1) (“An offense (other than criminal contempt)
must be prosecuted by an indictment if it is punishable by: (A) death; or (B) by
imprisonment for more than one year.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(B) (“An offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year may be prosecuted by information if the defendant—in open court and after being advised of the nature of
the charge and of the defendant’s rights—waives prosecution by indictment.”).
4
Id.
5
See, e.g., 15 Days to Slow the Spread, WhiteHouse.gov (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/.
1
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district courts suspended grand juries to protect jurors and courtroom employees from contracting COVID-19 through sustained
group contact. 6 Without grand juries, prosecutors could not obtain
indictments and defendants could not exercise their constitutional
right to be prosecuted by indictment. 7 The customary initiation process of the federal criminal justice system was on a break, but the
federal criminal justice system was not. The statutes of limitations
applicable to federal crimes continued to run even though there were
no grand juries to find the indictments that would stop those limitations clocks. 8 As a result, prosecutors faced a pandemic riddle: how
could they comply with both the statute of limitations and the Fifth
Amendment when there were no grand juries?
As the proverb posits, necessity is the mother of invention. 9 Unwilling to sacrifice either protecting the public health from viral variants or protecting the public safety from criminal perpetrators, prosecutors had to find novel solutions to familiar problems. One such
solution lies in the combination of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and
3289. 10 Using those statutes and that procedural rule in concert,
prosecutors can preserve the timeliness of most federal criminal
charges while grand juries are suspended, even for defendants who
invoke their Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment,
by filing an information before that statute of limitations expires,
dismissing the charges in the information without prejudice if the
defendant does not waive his right to prosecution by indictment, and
using the savings clauses that Congress added to the federal statutes
of limitations to indict the defendant on those charges within six
months of whenever grand juries resume. Some defendants, however, have challenged the legality of that solution, arguing that the
Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment is so paramount that, if grand juries are suspended when the statute of
See Grand Juries Carry on During Pandemic, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 27,
2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/10/27/grand-juries-carry-duringpandemic.
7
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6; FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
8
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
9
PLATO, REPUBLIC 47 (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2004 ed. C.D.C.
Reeve trans.) (“But its real creator, it seems, will be our need.”).
10
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289
6
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limitations expires, a defendant must automatically be absolved of
his crimes because he cannot be indicted for them. 11 In other words,
those defendants contend that the pandemic riddle is unsolvable and
that the cost of protecting the public from COVID-19, or some future national emergency, is that some criminals will go uncharged
and unpunished.
As often happens when competing American policy ideals do
battle, the winner will likely be declared in Florida. Florida was an
epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic, and, as a result, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida suspended grand juries for
longer than any other federal judicial district. 12 Indeed, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida suspended grand juries
from March 26, 2020, until November 17, 2020. 13 Accordingly, the
litigation over the legality of charging crimes with expiring statutes
of limitations via information while grand juries were suspended
during the COVID-19 pandemic primarily occurred in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. 14 That litigation resulted
in an intra-district split on the issue, with three district court judges
holding that filing an information tolls the statute of limitations and
one district court judge holding, instead, that the statute of limitations continues to run until either the defendant waives his right to

See, e.g., United States v. Sanfilippo, No. 21-60006-CR-ALTMAN, 2021
WL 5414945, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2021); United States v. Rosecan, 528 F.
Supp. 3d 1289, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2021); United States v. B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2021).
12
Max Greenwood & Julia Manchester, Florida Becomes Epicenter of
COVID-19 Surge, The Hill (Aug. 3, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/566168-florida-becomes-epicenter-of-covid-19-surge; Order
Concerning Partial Sequestration of Grand Juries, Administrative Order 2020-87
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Partial Sequestration of Grand Juries Order].
13
Order Concerning Grand Jury Sessions, Administrative Order 2020-22
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Grand Jury Sessions Order]; Seventh Order
Concerning Jury Trial and Other Procedures, Administrative Order 2020–76 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Seventh Jury Trial Order].
14
See, e.g., Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1289;
B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063.
11
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prosecution by indictment or an indictment is found by the grand
jury. 15
This article explains why the federal courts, including the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, should approve the
above-described solution for complying with the federal statute of
limitations and the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment during times when grand juries are suspended. The suggested
approach is permitted by the plain statutory language, and it strikes
the proper balance between a defendant’s constitutional right to indictment, a defendant’s statutory privilege to timely notice and the
public’s interest in safety and the enforcement of the criminal laws
during a national emergency. In addition, because the proposed solution is grounded in the text of well-established and long-standing
statutes and procedural rules, 16 it can be utilized during future national emergencies, even if courts cannot predict their scope, duration, or cause.
I.

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA IS A HOTSPOT OF
COVID-19 AND CRIME
On March 11, 2020, with worldwide COVID infections increasing at a dizzying rate, the World Health Organization declared the
COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic. 17 Two days later, the President of the United States declared that the COVID-19 outbreak in
the United States constituted a national emergency and recommended that measures be taken to control the virus’ spread. 18 By
April 1, 2020, Florida had 7,540 reported COVID-19 cases, which
was 3.1 percent of the reported COVID-19 cases in the United

Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945 at *3; United States v. Webster, 2021 WL
4952572, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,
2021 WL 4949170 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2021); Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1293.
But see United States v. Xavier, No. 20-cr-80054, slip op. at 5–6 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
8, 2021); B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12.
16
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
17
Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (noting
WHO’s declaration).
18
Id.
15
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States, 19 and, as a result, the State of Florida imposed strict stay-athome orders, closed schools, and shuttered public gathering
places. 20
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida was at the
epicenter of Florida’s relentless COVID-19 outbreak. 21 That federal
judicial district encompasses 15,197 square miles of Florida in nine
counties; it includes the large metropolitan areas of West Palm
Beach, Fort Lauderdale, and Miami; it is a major point of entry for
international travelers with multiple airports and seaports; and it has
a population of over 6.3 million.22 The coupling of that large and
dynamic population with the explosive spread of COVID-19
throughout Florida made public gatherings in the Southern District
of Florida particularly dangerous. 23 The District Court for the Southern District of Florida regularly convened such public gatherings,
including by holding grand jury sessions. 24 For example, during the
year before the COVID-19 outbreak—March 31, 2019 through
March 31, 2020—the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held 273 grand jury sessions during which 5,807 grand jurors met in groups of sixteen to twenty-three jurors for a total of
1,091 hours to find indictments. 25 Despite the heavy need that prosecutors had for grand juries in the district, the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida realized that it played a critical role in
combatting COVID-19 and had a duty to protect the health of civic
19
COVID Data Tracker, CTR FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, on April 1, 2020,
Florida had 7,540 reported COVID-19 cases and the United States had 240,876
reported COVID-19 cases. Id.
20
Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-91 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-91-compressed.pdf.
21
Federal Judicial Districts of Florida, U.S. Dist. Ct. S. Dist. Fla, https://
www.flsd.uscourts.gov/Federal-Judicial-Districts-Florida (last visited Feb. 13,
2022).
22
Id. See also Historical Overview, THE U.S. ATTY’S OFF. S. DIST. OF FLA,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/about (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
23
See id.; see also Greenwood & Manchester supra note 12.
24
Table J-1, U.S. District Courts-Grand and Petit Jurors Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2020), U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/j-1/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2020/
03/31.
25
Id.
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participants in the judicial system and judicial employees. 26 Thus,
the court suspended grand juries from March 26, 2020, until April
27, 2020. 27
Unfortunately, COVID-19 tightened its grip on South Florida as
2020 continued; infection rates skyrocketed and hospitals overflowed with pandemic patients. 28 As a result of that unabated viral
march through the state, the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida issued monthly orders further suspending grand juries for
additional thirty-day periods in May, June, and July 2020. 29 Finally,
on August 11, 2020, the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida entered a more permanent order, suspending all grand juries
until January 4, 2021. 30 About two months later, however, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida amended that order
and directed that, beginning on November 17, 2020, it would permit
two grand jury sessions per week, which was a fraction of the prepandemic number. 31 In total, no grand jury met in the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida for nearly eight months during
2020. 32
The disappearance of grand juries from the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida substantially impacted the court’s criminal docket. Between December 2019 and December 2020 only
sixty-eight grand jury sessions were held by the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida; the year before it held 273 grand

Grand Jury Sessions Order, supra note 13.
Id.
28
By the end of 2020, Florida had over 1,318,222 COVID-19 cases, which
was an increase to 6.5 percent of the total reported 20,150,162 COVID-19 cases
in the United States. Florida State Overview, Johns Hopkins U. Med.,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/us/florida (last visited March 5, 2022).
29
Third Order Concerning Jury Trial and Other Proceedings, Administrative
Order 2020-24 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Third Jury Trial Order];
Fourth Order Concerning Jury Trial and Other Proceedings, Administrative Order
2020-33 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2020) [hereinafter Fourth Jury Trial Order]; Fifth Order Concerning Jury Trial and Other Proceedings, Administrative Order 2020-41
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2020) [hereinafter Fifth Jury Trial Order].
30
Sixth Order Concerning Jury Trial and Other Proceedings, Administrative
Order 2020-53 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Sixth Jury Trial Order].
31
See Seventh Jury Trial Order, supra note 13.
32
Id. (setting parameters to resume grand juries which had paused since
March).
26
27

2022]

HIDING IN PLAIN LANGUAGE

947

jury sessions. 33 By comparison, during 2020, the Southern District
of New York, which encompasses Manhattan, held 177 grand jury
sessions; the Central District of California, which encompasses Los
Angeles, held 157 grand jury sessions; the District of Massachusetts,
which encompasses Boston, held 137 grand jury sessions; and the
Middle District of Florida, which encompasses Orlando and Tampa,
held 131 grand jury sessions. 34 As a result of that substantial decrease in the number of grand jury sessions, only 519 criminal
charging documents were filed in the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in 2020, compared to the 1552 charging documents filed in that court the year before. 35 That 66.8 percent decline
in criminal cases filed was the largest decrease in any federal district
court in 2020. 36 Indeed, the nationwide decrease in criminal cases
filed in federal district courts during 2020 was only 28.3 percent. 37
CONGRESS DID NOT AMEND THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
IN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
While the pandemic suspended public gatherings and destroyed
the ability of prosecutors to obtain indictments, it did not suspend
prosecutors’ obligation to pursue justice. 38 Courts had no choice but
to continue to enforce statutes of limitations, which encourage both
timely notice of and expeditious investigation into criminal charges
by limiting the time prosecutors have from the end of a defendant’s
II.

33

Table J-1—U.S. District Courts–Grand and Petit Jurors Statistical Tables
For The Federal Judiciary (December 31, 2020), U.S. COURTS (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/j-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/
2020/12/31; Table J-1, U.S. District Courts-Grand and Petit Jurors Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2020), U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/j-1/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/
2020/03/31.
34
Id.
35
Table D Cases—U.S. District Courts–Criminal Statistical Tables for The
Federal Judiciary (December 31, 2020), U.S. COURTS (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-cases/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2020/12/31.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
ABA, Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2
(2017) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds
of the law, not merely to convict.”).
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alleged criminal conduct to initiate criminal charges. 39 Under 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a), most non-capital federal crimes must be charged
within five years of the conclusion of the offense conduct. 40 Because
prosecutors are not required to indict a case at the moment they determine that probable cause supports the allegations, prosecutors often do not charge more complicated cases until the end of the limitations period to utilize the full amount of available time to marshal
and analyze the evidence needed to ensure proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 41
While 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides that the statute of limitations can be tolled when either an indictment is found or an information is instituted, the standard procedure used by prosecutors is
to charge federal crimes via indictment to ensure compliance with
the Fifth Amendment. 42 The Fifth Amendment provides all criminal
defendants with the right to be prosecuted by indictment; it specifies
that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury.” 43 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 gives effect to that
constitutional right by requiring that felonies “be prosecuted by an
indictment” unless the defendant has committed a non-capital felony
and agrees to “be prosecuted by information” and “waives prosecution by indictment” in “open court and after being advised of the
nature of the charges and of [his] rights.” 44 Thus, an indictment is a
preferrable charging document, because, unlike an information, the
defendant cannot decline to be adjudicated upon it. 45 But, if there
are no grand juries, there are no indictments. 46
At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the
United States Department of Justice sent proposed legislation to
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
Id. (“[N]o person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense,
not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within
five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”).
41
United States v. Dyal, 868 F.2d 424, 429 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The government has no constitutional duty to indict as soon as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the defendant is guilty.”).
42
U.S. CONST. amend V.
43
Id.
44
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), (b).
45
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b) (explaining waiver of indictment).
46
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
39
40
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Congress in an attempt to provide a simple, nationally-consistent solution to the tension a grand jury suspension creates between the
federal statute of limitations and the Fifth Amendment. 47 First, the
Department of Justice proposed amending 15 U.S.C. § 18a, which
governs antitrust criminal enforcement cases, to “suspend[]” the
running of the statute of limitations applicable to offenses arising
under that the laws in Title 15 of the United States Code for the later
of 180 days or 60 days after the termination of the COVID-19 national emergency. 48 Second, the Department of Justice proposed a
new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1660, which would authorize the chief
judge of any United States District Court, “in the event of a natural
disaster, civil disobedience, or other emergency situation requiring
the full or partial closure of courts” to toll the federal statutes of
limitations “for such period and in such judicial district as may be
appropriate.” 49 Third, the Department of Justice proposed a new
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3302, which would authorize the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, when the United States is in a
state of national emergency, to toll the federal statutes of limitation
“during the period of the national emergency and for one year following the end of the national emergency” if he finds “that emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning of the federal
courts.” 50
On March 27, 2020, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”). 51 The CARES
Act was a wide-ranging piece of largely economic legislation, and
it included none of the Department of Justice’s proposed statutes of
limitations legislation.52 Indeed, neither the text of the CARES Act
Charlie Savage, In Pandemic, Justice Dept. Seeks Video Court Hearings
and Home Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/20
20/03/23/us/politics/justice-department-coronavirus.html.
48
DEPT. OF JUST., Proposals for Addressing Issues Created by the COVID19 Pandemic, Tab A, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6835-combed-dojcoronavirus-legisla/06734bbf99a9e0b65249/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (this was a document purporting to be draft legislation submitted to Congress by the Department of Justice and obtained by the New York
Times).
49
Id. at Tab B.
50
Id.
51
CARES Act, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020).
52
See generally id.
47
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nor its official legislative history mention the statutes of limitations
at all. 53 Since the passage of the CARES Act, Congress has enacted
no legislation amending the federal statutes of limitations. Accordingly, if a federal judicial district chose to suspend grand juries to
protect the public health during the COVID-19 pandemic, it accepted the potential consequence that the statute of limitations could
expire on uncharged crimes committed in that district before a grand
jury could find an indictment. It was a choice between a death sentence for grand jurors and a get-out-of-jail-free card for criminals.
This choice loomed large in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, where, with each monthly order again suspending
grand juries, prosecutors anxiously watched as the statute of limitations clock ticked down in uncharged cases, knowing that Congress
was not going to intervene to help. 54
III.
A SOLUTION TO THE PANDEMIC RIDDLE WAS HIDING IN THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO
MOST FEDERAL CRIMES
Given the local decision to suspend grand juries and the national
decision not to suspend the statutes of limitations, prosecutors faced
a dire choice: (1) let any uncharged federal crimes committed in
2015 go unpunished because of the timing of an unfathomable
global pandemic or (2) find a way to constitutionally toll the statute
of limitations without assistance from either a grand jury or Congress. By putting together 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48(a), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289, prosecutors can solve the riddle of an expiring statute of limitations, a
suspended grand jury, and the Fifth Amendment. As this article explains, that solution, while seemingly novel, is found in the plain
language of long-existing legislation, and thus, can also be used during future national emergencies that necessitate the suspension of
grand juries.

53

Id.
See, e.g., Grand Jury Sessions Order, supra note 13; Second Jury Trial and
Other Proceedings, Administrative Order 2020-21 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2020);
Third Jury Trial Order, supra note 29; Fourth Jury Trial Order, supra note 29;
Fifth Jury Trial Order, supra note 29.
54
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A.

Prosecutors Can Toll the Statute of Limitations in 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a) by Filing an Information
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), the five-year statute of limitations applicable to most federal crimes is tolled when either “the indictment is found or the information is instituted.” 55 An indictment
and an information are both legal pleadings by which the federal
government initiates formal criminal charges, but there is a critical
difference as to how they are drafted. 56 An indictment must be
signed and sworn by the grand jury foreperson after at least twelve
grand jurors agree that the charges stated in it are supported by probable cause before it can be filed with the district court. 57 Thus, the
grand jury determines which charges are levied. 58 An information,
however, must only be signed and sworn by a prosecutor before it
can be filed with the district court. 59 Thus, it is prosecutors who determine which charges are levied. 60 Because an information does not
require a grand jury, it, unlike an indictment, could still be created
during the grand jury suspension. 61 Thus, depending on what the
phrase “the information is instituted” means in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a),
prosecutors could use an information to toll an expiring statute of
limitations while grand juries are suspended. 62

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 121 (4th ed. 2021).
57
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6; see United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122, 127 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“The Fifth Amendment made the right to indictment by grand jury
mandatory in federal prosecutions in recognition of the fact that the intervention
of a grand jury was a substantial safeguard against oppressive and arbitrary proceedings.”) (quoting Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) (internal citations omitted).
58
Id.
59
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56. An information is often used to initiate
a case in which the defendant either agrees there was probable cause to support
the allegations against him or wishes to expedite his case. Because it does not
require the involvement of a grand jury—which requires waiting for an available
grand jury session, waiting for the prosecutor to present his case, and waiting for
the grand jury to find probable cause and return the indictment in open court—
cases prosecuted by information are generally adjudicated more quickly. See id.
60
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56.
61
Id.
62
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
55
56
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The starting point for defining “instituted” is the statutory text.
The primary canon of statutory interpretation directs that the “plain
meaning” of the word controls if it is unambiguous. 63 In determining
the “plain meaning” of a word, courts look to dictionary definitions
while considering the word’s specific context within the sentence
and general context within the statutory scheme. 64 In addition, there
is a presumption that Congress is deliberate in the words that it includes and the words that it omits from a statute, which informs the
meaning of the included words. 65
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “instituted” as “inaugurate[d],”
“commence[d],” “start[ed],” or “introduce[d].” 66 Similarly, Webster’s Dictionary defines “instituted” as “to originate and get established.” 67 And, back in 1785—five years before Congress enacted
the original version of the federal statutes of limitations that included the phrase “the indictment, or information for the same, shall
be found or instituted” 68—Dr. Johnson’s dictionary defined “institute” as to “establish” or to “enact.” 69 Thus, at all relevant times
since the inception of the federal statutes of limitations, the term
“instituted” has meant the beginning or creation of an item.
The object of “instituted” in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) is the “information.” 70 Thus, what must be “established” or “commenced” is the
information. Because it is a legal pleading, an information comes
63
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304
F.3d 1076, 1087 (11th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Rojas, 718 F.3d 1317,
1319 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The starting point for statutory interpretation purposes is
the language of the statute itself.” (quoting United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681
F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012)) (internal citations omitted).
64
United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the court will “analyze the language of the provision at issue, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute
as a whole” to determine the meaning of a statutory term).
65
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2019).
66
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (11th ed. 2019).
67
Institute, MIRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/institute (last visited Mar. 5, 2022).
68
Crimes Act of 1790, ch.9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
69
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed.
1785) (defining “institute” as “[t]o establish; to appoint; to enact; to form and
prescribe,” “[t]o found; to originate and establish,” and “[t]o begin; to commence;
to set into operation”).
70
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
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into existence when it is accepted by the courts. That occurs when
the information is filed with the district court; it is docketed and
takes its place as a legal filing. Indeed, once filed, an information
takes on its inherent powers—it institutes the formal charges against
the defendant, it confers subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts, 71 it permits the defendant to file responsive legal pleadings,
and it permits case management procedures to begin. 72
Accordingly, under that plain and unambiguous meaning of the
words Congress used in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), “the information is instituted” when it is filed with the district court, tolling the statute of
limitations. 73 Because there is no suggestion in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Based on that statute, the United States Supreme Court
held in United States v. Cotton that, so long as the charging document states an
offense “against the laws of the United States,” then federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction regardless of any legal or procedural defects in that charging
document. 535 U.S. 625, 629–30 (2002); see United States v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d
894, 903 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An indictment’s relationship to jurisdiction is thus
based on whether it alleges conduct constituting a federal offense, not on some
intrinsic value of an indictment as such. This understanding of jurisdiction explains why a defendant can waive an indictment and consent to proceed by information; i.e., the court maintains jurisdiction so long as the information alleges a
federal offense.”). Indeed, in 2004, in Kontrick v. Ryan, the Supreme Court explained that only Congress can alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts and that
court-proscribed procedural rules—including the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—neither create nor withdraw jurisdiction. 540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004).
Instead, those procedural rules provide how the jurisdiction granted to the courts
by Congress should be exercised. Id.; see also United States v. Daughenbaugh,
549 F.3d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the “absence of a waiver of
indictment” as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), “is a nonjurisdictional defect” under Cotton).
72
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56.
73
The Supreme Court, interpreting a different statute of limitations, held that
“instituted” required more than filing the charging document with the district
court. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220, 230 (1965). That case, however,
is inapposite, and it does not require that an information is “instituted” under 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a) only if that information complies with all the requirements of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Jaben analyzed what was required under
26 U.S.C. § 653 to apply a nine-month extension to a statute of limitations available if a complaint was “instituted before a commissioner of the United States.”
71
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of any further requirement, that clear statutory language is the beginning and end of the analysis. 74
The rest of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) lends greater credence to that
interpretation of “the information is instituted.” 75 Another central
canon of statutory interpretation is that “[i]n ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory
language at issue as well as the language and design of the statute as
a whole.” 76 Accordingly, “[w]hen Congress uses ‘different language
in similar sections,’” the courts should give those words “different
meanings.” 77 In its entirety, 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) states that “no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
Id. at 215. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a prosecutor filing a
draft complaint was sufficient to “institute” it under 26 U.S.C. § 6531. Id. at 230.
Instead, the Supreme Court held that the extension applied only if the complaint
complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 3—which required a commissioner to find that probable cause supported the charges in the complaint—because were that not the case, then the Commissioner’s role would be a nullity and
the statutory text referencing the commissioner would be superfluous. Id. at 226–
27. Critical to Jaben’s reasoning was that the statute of limitations specified that
the complaint had to be “instituted before a commissioner of the United States.”
See id. at 217. That additional directive is not present in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). In
addition, Jaben’s reasoning was tied to the fact that it involved a complaint,
which, at that time, could not be drafted sufficient for filing until a commissioner
found that it is supported by probable cause. See id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 3. In
contrast, for an information to be drafted sufficient for filing, a prosecutor must
provide a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charge” and sign it. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). Thus, while a
prosecutor could not file a complaint without first obtaining a probable cause determination from a commissioner, a prosecutor can file an information as soon as
it is written and signed. Id. at 230.
74
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words
of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry
is complete.’”); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994)
(Even where there are “contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history . . .
we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”).
75
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
76
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
77
McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089
(11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted); S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use
of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended
to convey a different meaning for those words.”).
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within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 78 By using the terms “prosecuted” and “instituted” in the same
sentence, Congress indicated that the two verbs carry distinct meanings and “instituted” must be something less than “prosecuted.” 79
Put conversely, the statute is clear that, to stop the limitations clock,
an information must merely be filed such that it becomes a formal
legal pleading. To read the statute in any other way would render
Congress’ use of two different verbs unnecessary.
Some defendants, however, have opposed that textual interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)’s “the information is instituted,” contending that more must be required to “institute” an information because it is not a charging document equivalent to an indictment.80
They contend that 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) must be read in concert with
the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), because those two provisions curtail the circumstances in which an information can be used to prosecute a defendant. 81 Those defendants posit that an information is
not “instituted” when it is filed, and, instead, an information is instituted only after both a prosecutor files it with the district court and
the defendant waives his right to prosecution by indictment, which
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires before a defendant
can be prosecuted by information. 82 Put differently, under this theory “instituted” in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) is synonymous with “prosecuted” in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), 83 and only an
information that satisfies all the procedural requirements for a district court to adjudicate its charges tolls the statute of limitations.
This argument is unpersuasive and reaches far beyond the plain and

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (emphasis added).
Id.
80
See United States v. Webster, 2021 WL 4952572, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27,
2021) (“But, Defendant argues that the filing of a waiver-less information for felony charges is inconsistent with the purpose and statutory text of 18 U.S.C. §
3282(a).”); United States v. Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2021)
(“Dr. Rosecan . . . asserts that the information is defective because it was not accompanied by a waiver of indictment and was therefore insufficient to begin the
prosecution within the limitations period.”).
81
See supra note 80.
82
See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b).
83
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b).
78
79
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unambiguous language of both 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) does not impact the interpretation of the federal statutes of limitations. It is a claim-processing rule that only concerns what procedures must be followed
to ensure that a defendant is fully aware of his Fifth Amendment
right to prosecution by indictment before he is adjudicated—via either a trial or guilty plea—on charges that are brought in an information. 84 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires that, for
a defendant “to be prosecuted by information,” he must first knowingly waive “prosecution by indictment” in “open court.” 85 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 does not use the verb “instituted” and
it does not state in any of its sections that an information does not
exist until a defendant waives prosecution by indictment. 86 Further,
under Rule 7(b), “[i]t is inconsequential whether the information is
filed before or after the defendant has waived indictment.” 87
Not only are the objects—the defendant and the information—
of the two actions different, but also institution is a different moment
in a criminal case’s life than prosecution. Instituted and prosecuted
have different meanings. The verb “to institute” means to begin,
start, or commence—it connotes the creation of a legal pleading—
while the verb “to prosecute” means to “institute and pursue a criminal action against (a person)”—it connotes the legal document’s ultimate denouement in an adjudication. 88 Thus, prosecuting is more
than instituting. In writing 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Congress did not
include that more. Instead, Congress stated that institution alone was
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and there is nothing in 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a) that suggests that the information must be able to
support a prosecution before the expiration of the limitations period.
If Congress had intended to make the ability of an information to
prosecute a defendant an element of the statute of limitations, it
would have so said. It did not.
The same analysis applies to 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f), confirming that Congress saw the
84
85
86
87
88

See United States v. Hartwell, 448 F.3d 707, 717 (4th Cir. 2006).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
See id.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 951, 1476 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
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ultimate prosecutorial viability of a charging document as a separate
inquiry from the tolling of the statute of limitations. As explained
above, the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) is tolled
when “the indictment is found.” 89 Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(f), a grand jury is required to both find and “return” an
indictment before the defendant can be adjudicated. 90 The title of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f) is “Indictment and Return,”
connoting that the establishment of an indictment and its return are
two separate procedural moments. 91 An indictment is “found” when
twelve grand jurors agree the allegations are supported by probable
cause and the foreperson subscribes to a true bill—that is when a
legal pleading capable of being filed is created. 92 Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(f) does not suggest that an indictment is
“found” only after it is also returned, meaning it is publicly docketed. 93 Instead, as with the information, the pivotal moment for the
statute of limitations is when a prosecutor’s allegations evolve into
a legal pleading that can be filed with the court. 94 The additional
requirement that the indictment be returned was omitted from 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a), just as the additional requirement that an information be accompanied by a waiver of prosecution by indictment
was omitted from 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 95 Thus, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(f) requires “found plus” just as Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires “instituted plus,” and neither of

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f) (“The grand jury—or its foreperson or deputy foreperson—must return the indictment to a magistrate judge in open court.” (emphasis added)).
91
Id.; see Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 256 (2000) (“[T]he title of a
statute is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase in
the statute itself.”); United States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1250–51 (10th
Cir. 2002) (“Although the title to a statutory provision is not part of the law itself,
it can be used to interpret a statute.”).
92
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
93
This is because indictments must be “found” by grand juries and cannot
merely be written or issued by prosecutors or courts. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 9 (1887), overruled in part by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)
(holding a defective indictment no longer deprives a court of federal subject matter jurisdiction).
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(f).
95
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
89
90
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those “plus” elements are required by 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) to toll the
statute of limitations.96
Reading “instituted” as requiring only that the information be
filed with the district court is supported by the entirety of the federal
statutes of limitations. 97 In 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289, Congress
created two savings clauses for charges brought in indictments and
informations that were filed within the limitations period but then
were dismissed either after the limitations period ran (18 U.S.C.
§ 3288) 98 or with less than six months remaining on the applicable
statute of limitations clock (18 U.S.C. § 3289). 99 In both instances,
96
See Thompson, 287 F.3d at 1251 (“This court holds that an indictment is
‘found’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 when the grand jury votes to indict the defendant
and the foreperson subscribes the indictment as a true bill,” not when the indictment is returned).
97
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288, 3289.
98
18 U.S.C. § 3288 (“Whenever an indictment or information charging a felony is dismissed for any reason after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired, a new indictment may be returned in the appropriate jurisdiction within six calendar months of the date of the dismissal of the indictment or information, or, in the event of an appeal, within 60 days of the date
the dismissal of the indictment or information becomes final, or, if no regular
grand jury is in session in the appropriate jurisdiction when the indictment or
information is dismissed, within six calendar months of the date when the next
regular grand jury is convened, which new indictment shall not be barred by any
statute of limitations. This section does not permit the filing of a new indictment
or information where the reason for the dismissal was the failure to file the indictment or information within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, or some other reason that would bar a new prosecution.” (emphasis
added)).
99
18 U.S.C. § 3289 (“Whenever an indictment or information charging a felony is dismissed for any reason before the period prescribed by the applicable
statute of limitations has expired, and such period will expire within six calendar
months of the date of the dismissal of the indictment or information, a new indictment may be returned in the appropriate jurisdiction within six calendar months
of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, or, in the event of an
appeal, within 60 days of the date the dismissal of the indictment or information
becomes final, or, if no regular grand jury is in session in the appropriate jurisdiction at the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, within six calendar months of the date when the next regular grand jury is convened, which new
indictment shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. This section does not
permit the filing of a new indictment or information where the reason for the dismissal was the failure to file the indictment or information within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, or some other reason that would
bar a new prosecution.” (emphasis added)).
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Congress decided that an additional six-month statute of limitations
would apply to the dismissed charges. 100 That six-month limitations
period runs from the later of the end of the original statute of limitations period, the date that the charges are dismissed, or the date on
which the next regular grand jury is convened; a 60-day limitations
period applies if the entry of dismissal results from an appeal.101
And, importantly for instant purposes, both 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and
3289 explain that the savings clauses only have the following two
exceptions: (1) the reason for the dismissal “was the failure to file
the indictment or information within the period prescribed by the
applicable statute of limitations” or (2) the reason for the dismissal
was “some other reason that would bar a new prosecution.” 102 As
the emphasized portions of the above quotation show, the savings
clauses apply to an information dismissed for “any” reason so long
as it was “file[d]” within the limitations period. 103 That verb choice
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289—to file—to describe the act that
rendered the indictment or information timely indicates that Congress intended for the terms “instituted” and “filed” to be synonymous with respect to an information.
That Congress used the term “instituted” in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a),
which was written in 1790, and the term “filed” in 18 U.S.C. § 3288,
which was written in 1948, 104 to describe the same moment—when
the statute of limitations is tolled by an information—is logical.105
In 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Congress, at the time when American criminal procedure was being developed, specified that an indictment
tolls the statute of limitations when it is “found” and an information
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. (emphasis added).
104
18 U.S.C. § 3288 (Supp. II 1949). Congress first added a savings clause for
dismissed charges to the statutes of limitations in 1934, but it used significantly
different language. In its original iteration, Congress stated, “[w]henever an indictment is found defective or insufficient for any cause, after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired, a new indictment may
be returned at any time during the next succeeding term of court following such
finding, during which a grand jury thereof shall be in session.” Act effective May
10, 1934, ch. 278, 48 Stat. 772 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3288). See
generally United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U.S. 68, 70–71 (1939) (discussing the creation of the statute of limitations savings clause).
105
18 U.S.C. §§ 3282(a), 3288.
100
101
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tolls the statute of limitations when it is “instituted.” 106 Those different verbs denote the different paths that an indictment and an information take in drafting. As aforementioned, a list of allegations
does not become an indictment that can be filed as a legal pleading
until twelve grand jurors agree that the allegations written by a prosecutor are supported by probable cause. 107 But a list of allegations
written by a prosecutor becomes an information that can be filed as
a legal pleading once it is written and signed by a prosecutor. 108 The
use of those two different verbs in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)—“found”
and “instituted”—made it clear that an indictment and an information still had to adhere to their individual, differing drafting requirements to toll the statute of limitations.109 In writing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3288 in 1948, Congress was no longer so concerned with that prefiling documentary evolution. After 1946, those drafting requirements were enshrined in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 110
Further, the applicability of the savings clause hinges only upon
whether the now-dismissed charging document tolled the statute of
limitations.111 In that context, the verb “filed” could be used to cover
both an indictment and an information in a single, more concise
clause, because it is the final step of filing that tolls the statute of
limitations for all charging documents regardless of what had to occur to ready the document to be accepted for that “filing.” 112
In addition to comporting with the plain meaning of the statutory
language in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282(a), 3288, and 3289, defining “instituted” as “filed with the district court”—and not also compliant with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b)—comports with the purposes of the federal statutes of limitations and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b). 113 The statutes of limitations, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3281-91, “represent legislative assessments of relative interests
of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (1946); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289.
See id.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282(a), 3288, 3289; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
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justice.” 114 Their purpose is primarily to provide notice to the defendant within a reasonable amount of time so that the defendant can
locate witnesses and evidence to support any potential defenses and
secondarily to encourage the expeditious investigation of crimes by
law enforcement. 115 Both purposes are satisfied by the plain meaning reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3282’s text. Regardless of whether a defendant has waived his right to prosecution by indictment, a filed
information gives the defendant notice of the allegations charged
against him in a formal legal pleading, guarantees against “overly
stale criminal charges” and the potential loss of access to exculpatory witnesses or evidence, and ensures that law enforcement completes its investigation promptly. 116
The purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) is to
protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment, 117 and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment is to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves from unfounded criminal charges. 118 Specifically, the
Fifth Amendment was enacted to ensure that an individual “shall not
be put upon his trial” without the benefit of an indictment, which are
accusations by his fellow citizens upon a finding of probable
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971); Smith v. United States,
568 U.S. 106, 112 (2013) (“A statute-of-limitations defense does not call the criminality of the defendant’s conduct into question, but rather reflects a policy judgment by the legislature that the lapse of time may render criminal acts ill suited
for prosecution.”).
115
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 785, 789 (1977); Toussie v. United
States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970) (noting that statutes of limitations “protect
individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts
may have become obscured by the passage of time” and “may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity”); see also United States v. Ratcliff, 245 F.3d 1246, 1253
(11th Cir. 2001) (“Notice to the defendant is the central policy underlying the
statute of limitations.”).
116
United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Statutes
of limitations play an important role in ensuring the reliability of evidence presented at trial: by preventing stale claims—and the accompanying lost evidence
and witnesses with faded memories—adjudication becomes both more efficient
and more reliable.”).
117
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
118
See U.S. CONST. amend V; see also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S 417, 426
(1885); see also United States v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d 894, 904 (11th Cir. 2013).
114
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cause. 119 It ensures the charges are independently evaluated and
considered by more than just a prosecutor or judge. 120 Tolling the
statute of limitations before a defendant invokes or waives his Fifth
Amendment right to prosecution by indictment does not impact this
Constitutional protection. Instead, as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) makes clear, a defendant cannot be adjudicated on the
charges in an information—meaning he can neither plead guilty to
them nor be tried upon them—until he knowingly waives his right
to prosecution by indictment. 121 He can make that waiver—or decline to make that waiver—at any time, including after the statute of
limitations has expired, because it is concerned with the conclusion
of the criminal proceedings, not their beginning.
In addition, conditioning the tolling of the statute of limitations
by an information on when the defendant waives his right to prosecution by indictment gives the defendant complete control over
whether he is immunized from his alleged criminal conduct. Defendants have a vested interest in immunizing themselves from
criminal allegations. Thus, there is a strong incentive for a defendant
who is charged by an information to delay his decision to waive his
right to prosecution until after the statute of limitations has run. At
that point—if an information is not “instituted” until the defendant
files a waiver of prosecution by indictment—the defendant can then
assert his right to prosecution by indictment, rendering the charges
in the information untimely and immunizing himself from prosecution on them. That cannot be correct. Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative procedural defense, it cannot hinge solely on
the conduct of the defendant but, instead, should hinge on the conduct of the prosecutor.
Finally, the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282, 3288, and
3289 supports the interpretation of “instituted” as tolling the statute
of limitations when an information is filed with the court.
The first federal statute of limitations was enacted in 1790. 122 It
stated, “nor shall any person be prosecuted, tried or punished for any
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426; McIntosh, 704 F.3d at 904 (“Simply put,
the Grand Jury Clause requires that an indictment be in place before a person can
be held to reply to a charge.”).
120
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
121
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
122
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
119
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offense, not capital, nor any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, unless the indictment or information for the same shall be found
or instituted within two years from the time of committing the offense.” 123 Thus, from the start, the federal statute of limitations was
tolled when an information was “instituted.” 124 A year later, in 1791,
the United States ratified the Fifth Amendment, which enshrined the
individual right to be prosecuted by indictment on felony charges. 125
Thus, when Congress voted on that first statute of limitations, the
right to prosecution by indictment did not exist.126 That underscores
what the text shows: an information could be instituted for felonies
simply by filing it with the court and the tolling of the statute of
limitations did not turn on the defendant’s conduct.
The forward-moving legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
further supports that interpretation. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), along with the other Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
was adopted in 1946. 127 Although several federal courts had held
that a defendant could waive his right to prosecution by indictment
in a felony case, that was the first time it was codified as a nationally-applicable procedural policy. 128 Since 1946, Congress has
amended 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) four times. 129 At every amendment,
Congress was certainly aware that, under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(b), defendants charged with felony offenses had to
123

Id.
See id.
125
See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 11 n.81 (1996) (citing
Sara Sun Beale & William C. Bryson, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 1.4 (1986)).
126
See id.
127
FED. R. CRIM. P. (“the original rules . . . became effective on March 21,
1946”).
128
Id. See George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
II, 56 YALE L. J. 197, 205 (1947) (“The provision in Rule 7(b) providing for
waiver of indictment has long been recommended.”).
129
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 828 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a)) (changing the limitations period from five to three years and
adding exceptions for certain crimes); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1214, § 12(a),
formerly §10(a), 68 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a))
(changing the limitations period back to five years); Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 12(a),
75 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (changing the effective
date of the amendment); Act of Apr. 30, 2003, § 610, 117 Stat. 692 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)) (adding an exception for certain offenses).
124
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waive their right to prosecution by indictment before they could be
adjudicated on an information. 130 Yet, Congress never altered,
amended, or deleted the phrase “information is instituted” in 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a) to give it a deeper or different meaning, including
to require that the defendant waive prosecution by indictment within
the five-year limitations period. 131
Indeed, when Congress last amended 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) in
2003, 132 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and two district courts had held that filing an information tolls the
statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) and that the defendant’s
waiver of prosecution by indictment has no bearing on the statute of
limitations.133 No court had reached a contrary conclusion, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had applied
that holding and reasoning to guide its determination in a related
context. 134 In the face of that consistent body of common law interpreting what “instituted” meant in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Congress
yet again elected not to alter that statutory text. 135 As the Supreme
Court explained, “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” 136 As written,
130

See id.
See id.
132
See Act of Apr. 30, 2003, § 610, 117 Stat. 692 (adding an exception to the
statute of limitations for certain offenses).
133
In 1998, in United States v. Burdix-Dana, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that filing an information tolls the statute of
limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 149 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1998). BurdixDana rejected the argument that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires
that a defendant also waive prosecution by indictment within five years to toll the
statute of limitations. Id. Before 2003, two district courts in other circuits followed
Burdix-Dana. United States v. Hsin-Yung, 97 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2000);
United States v. Watson, 941 F. Supp. 601, 603 (N.D. W.Va. 1996).
134
Before 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited
Burdix-Dana with approval and two district courts in other circuits followed it.
See Thompson, 287 F.3d at 1250.
135
See 18 U.S.C. 3282(a).
136
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Keene Corp v. United States,
508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993) (“[W]e apply the presumption that Congress was aware
of these earlier judicial interpretations and, in effect, adopted them.”); White v.
Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“Congress is assumed to act with the knowledge of existing law and interpretations when it passes new legislation.”).
131
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18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) clearly tolls the statute of limitations when an
information is filed with the court regardless of whether the defendant ultimately consents to be prosecuted by it. 137
The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3288 also supports this
interpretation. In 1964, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3288 to state
that the savings clause only applied to an information that was filed
within the limitations period “after the defendant waives in open
court prosecution by indictment.” 138 In 1988, Congress removed
that language. 139 A defendant is no longer required to waive prosecution by indictment in open court, and, instead, the savings clause
applies if an information was dismissed “for any reason” other than
its failure to be “filed” within the limitations period or another reason that would bar re-prosecution entirely. 140 The purpose of that
amendment was to expand 18 U.S.C. § 3288, because “[t]he reason
a charge is dismissed (unless the reason for the dismissal would independently bar further prosecution such as a dismissal on grounds
of double jeopardy or a dismissal ‘with prejudice’ under a statute)
should not determine whether the government is given additional
time to bring a new prosecution.” 141 Thus, the legislative history of
18 U.S.C. § 3288 indicates that Congress, at least after 1988, did not
intend a defendant’s waiver of his right to prosecution by indictment
to play any role in the determination of when the statute of limitations is tolled. 142 And, of course, Congress knew of that 1988
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3288 when it last amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a) in 2003, yet it did not alter or amend the phrase the “information is instituted.” 143
Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides a mechanism for
prosecutors to toll the statute of limitations without a grand jury.144
But tolling the statute of limitations only begins a case’s journey
down its path to adjudication. The Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment still has to be upheld during a time when there
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
Act of Aug. 30, 1964. 88-520, § 1, 78 Stat. 699 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 3288; 134 Cong. Rec. 13660, 13785 (daily ed. June 8, 1988).
18 U.S.C. § 3288.
18 U.S.C. § 3288; 134 Cong. Rec., supra note 139.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3288.
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3288.

966

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

are no grand juries. 145 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(b), a district court can adjudicate charges brought in an information only if the defendant knowingly waives his right to prosecution by indictment. 146 Thus, for defendants who invoke their Fifth
Amendment right to prosecution by indictment during a grand jury
suspension, their cases can proceed no further on the information.
Prosecutors are again placed in a situation where they would usually
turn to a grand jury for assistance, but there are none. Thus, again,
prosecutors need a novel solution in already-existing legislation to
continue to solve the pandemic riddle. Fortunately, such a solution
exists in the combination of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289. 147
B.
After that Information Tolls the Statute of Limitations,
Prosecutors Can Uphold a Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right by
Dismissing that Information Without Prejudice under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a)
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), “[t]he government may, with leave of the court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint.” 148 While Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a) requires “leave of the court,” the Supreme Court has been clear
that phrase confers no substantial role for the judiciary. 149 Instead,
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury.”).
146
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
147
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288, 3289.
148
FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
149
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29, n.15, 30 (1977); see also United
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The exercise of its discretion
with respect to the termination of pending prosecutions should not be judicially
disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest.”); United States v.
Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2000) (“While [Rule 48(a)] confers discretion on the district court to deny the government’s motion to dismiss a charging
document, this discretion is not broad.”). This narrow grant of judicial authority
preserves the separation of powers. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”); Cowan, 524
F.2d at 513 (“The Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution
should be initiated and the first and presumptively the best judge of whether a
145
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prosecutors have wide authority to dismiss an information under this
Rule, and, “unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, Rule 48(a)
dismissals are without prejudice[,]” allowing prosecutors to bring
the charges in a subsequent indictment. 150 Indeed, in resolving a
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion brought by a prosecutor, the district court can deny that motion—by either dismissing
the information with prejudice or refusing to dismiss the information—only where the district court finds that the defendant sufficiently demonstrated that the prosecutor sought to dismiss the information in “bad faith.” 151
To demonstrate that a dismissal is sought in bad faith, the defendant must show that the prosecutor is seeking it “to achieve a
tactical advantage in derogation of the defendant’s rights or for the
purpose of harassment.” 152 Courts have found bad faith only where
pending prosecution should be terminated.”); see also United States v. Fokker
Services, 818 F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The Constitution allocates primacy
in criminal charging decisions to the Executive Branch . . . .It has long been settled that the Judiciary generally lacks authority to second-guess those Executive
determinations, much less to impose its own charging preferences.”); United
States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628, n.13 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In balancing the rights
and powers of the Executive Branch with those of the Judiciary, we must keep in
mind that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is to be given great deference by
the courts.”). Those settled principles countenance against interpreting rules to
impinge on the Executive’s constitutionally rooted primacy over charging decisions.
150
United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Wellborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the presumption
that a prosecutor seeks dismissal of an indictment or information in good faith “is
rooted in a proper respect for the constitutional division of power between the
executive and judicial branches of government”).
151
Matta, 937 F.2d at 568. In addition, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, district courts have authority to retroactively dismiss an
information or indictment with prejudice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) after initially granting the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss without considering the reason for the dismissal. See id. A district court can dismiss a superseding indictment with prejudice where the defendant demonstrates that he “had
been prejudiced in his ability to challenge the prosecutor’s motives because the
government failed to articulate its reasons for the dismissal.” Id. Here, this second
narrow avenue for denying a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion is
inapplicable as the prosecutor’s reason for the dismissal—the defendant’s decision not to waive his right to prosecution by indictment as required by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b)—is obvious and stated.
152
United States v. Dyal, 868 F.2d 424, 428–29 (11th Cir. 1989).
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the prosecutor sought dismissal: (1) because he was bribed to do
so 153; (2) because he wanted to attend a social event at the time of
trial 154; (3) because he disliked the victim 155; (4) because he wanted
to pick different jurors after he made his selection 156; and (5) because he failed to conduct forensic testing on evidence that he had
for months before the speedy trial clock expired. 157 Further, the “bad
faith” analysis is only concerned with the prosecutor’s reason for
dismissing that charging document; it does not consider the validity
of the prosecutor’s reason for bringing that charging document or
the prosecutor’s strategy for the case. 158 In sum, prosecutorial bad
faith only arises in the rarest circumstances, and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48(a) motions are freely and regularly granted
by the district courts. 159
Dismissing an information because the defendant did not enter a
waiver of prosecution by indictment as required by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(b) is not one of the rare times the district court
has authority to deny a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a)
motion to dismiss without prejudice. 160 There is no bad faith in seeking to dismiss an information on which adjudication cannot be rendered, and a dismissal followed by single renewed prosecution via
the defendant’s preferred charging document is not prosecutorial
harassment. 161 Thus, when a defendant declines to be prosecuted on
an information, while the statute of limitations is tolled on the
charges, the prosecutor can and must move to dismiss the
Hamm, 659 F.2d at 630.
Id.
155
Id.
156
United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 353 (1982).
157
United States v. Pitts, 331 F.R.D 199, 204–05 (D.D.C. 2019).
158
See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30 (1977) (“The salient issue . . .
is not whether the decision to maintain the federal prosecution was made in bad
faith but rather whether the Government’s later efforts to terminate the prosecution were similarly tainted with impropriety.”).
159
See Hamm, 659 F.2d at 629 (explaining judiciary’s authority to deny a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion to dismiss without prejudice is confined to “extremely limited circumstances in extraordinary cases.”); United States
v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Rule 48(a) motions must be
granted “in the overwhelming number of cases.”).
160
Hamm, 659 F.2d at 629–30.
161
See id. at 628–30.
153
154
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information without prejudice and then prosecute the defendant with
an indictment bringing the same allegations and charges.
But, of course, once prosecutors dismiss such an information,
they still need a grand jury to find an indictment at a time when there
are none. 162 Thus, for a third time, prosecutors need a solution in
already-existing legislation to solve the pandemic riddle. Fortunately, the savings clauses in 18 U.S.C. § 3288 and 3289 permit
prosecutors to obtain a timely indictment no matter how long a
grand jury suspension lasts. 163
C.
Prosecutors Have Six Months from the Date on Which the
Next Regular Grand Jury is Convended to Indict the Defendant on
Those Dismissed Charges under18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 or 3289
In 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289, Congress created savings
clauses under which prosecutors can file a timely indictment bringing the same charges raised in an “information charging a felony”
that was “dismissed for any reason” either within six months of the
otherwise-applicable statute of limitations expiring or after that statute of limitations expired. 164 Prosecutors can bring the charges in a
new indictment, which will be timely, within the latter of: (1) “six
calendar months of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations”; (2) “six calendar months of the date of dismissal” of the
charges; (3) “if no regular grand jury is in session in the appropriate
jurisdiction when the . . . information is dismissed, within six calendar months of the date when the next regular grand jury is convened”; or (4) “in the event of an appeal, within 60 days of the date
the dismissal of the . . . information becomes final.” 165 The only exceptions to these savings clauses are that they do not “permit the
filing of a new indictment or information where the reason for the
dismissal was the failure to file the indictment or information within
the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, or
some other reason that would bar a new prosecution.” 166
Under their plain and unambiguous language, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288
and 3289 apply to an information that was instituted—which, as
162
163
164
165
166

U.S. CONST. amend V; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289.
Id.
18 U.S.C. §3289.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. 3288.
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explained above, means filed with the court—and then dismissed
without prejudice because the defendant did not waive prosecution
by indictment as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(b). 167 That procedural reason falls within the broad category of
“any reason after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of
limitations has expired” and neither exception to the savings clauses
applies. 168 The information was filed within the limitations period,
and a failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(b) does not bar a new prosecution on the charges. 169 Indeed, the
purpose of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289 is to permit prosecutors to
re-charge cases if a legal or procedural deficiency arises in the indictment or information just before or after the limitations period
expires. 170 That is precisely what occurs when a defendant declines
to consent to be prosecuted by a filed information just before or after
the statute of limitations expires.
Thus, so long as an information is filed with the court within the
five-year limitations period, prosecutors can dismiss that information if the defendant does not waive prosecution by indictment.171
Prosecutors then have six months from the date that the next grand
jury meets in that judicial district to indict the defendant on the same
charges. 172 This permits prosecutors to timely indict defendants
even when grand juries are suspended for months before and after
the statute of limitations on their criminal conduct expires.
Combining 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289, provides a solution
to the pandemic riddle that upholds both a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment and a defendant’s statutory
18 U.S.C. §§ 3288, 3289.
18 U.S.C. § 3288 (emphasis added).
169
See United States v. Macklin, 535 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 3288 applies to an “information that was a nullity because only
an indictment would suffice”).
170
United States v. Clawson, 104 F.3d 250, 252 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating the
“very purpose for which § 3288 was enacted” was to allow “a second indictment
to remedy legal deficiencies present in the first.”); see also United States v. Italiano, 894 F.2d 1280, 1286, n. 10 (11th Cir. 1990) (“We agree with other courts of
appeals that have addressed the issue that § 3288 is available to correct legal defects as well as grand jury defects or irregularities.”).
171
See id.
172
18 U.S.C. § 3288.
167
168
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privilege to timely notice of criminal charges against him when a
judicially-mandated grand jury suspension prevents prosecutors
from obtaining indictments. That solution is supported at every turn
by the words of Congress. 173 But that solution has not yet garnered
post-pandemic approval from the federal appellate courts, and the
federal district courts have split on whether filing an information
tolls 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 174 Indeed, in the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, where several cases were charged via
information as the limitations period in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) expired
during the COVID-19 grand jury suspension, 175 it is an open question of law as to what “instituted” requires, as to whether a dismissal
due to a lack of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) waiver is
a dismissal sought in bad faith under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), and as to whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289 can be
used to file a timely indictment where an information is dismissed
just before or after the statute of limitations ran because the defendant did not waive prosecution by indictment as is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b).

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289.
See United States v. B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
11, 2020) (“I decline to conclude that the unconsented Information in this case
was ‘instituted’ within the meaning of § 3282”); United States v. Sharma, No.
414-CR-61, 2006 WL 2926365, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2016) (holding that an
information lacking a waiver of indictment does not mean a case was “initiated”).
But see United States v. Briscoe, No. CR-RDB-20-0139, 2020 WL 5076053, at
*2 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2020) (“An information is ‘instituted’ when it is properly
filed, regardless of the Defendant’s waiver.”); United States v. Holmes, No. 18cr-00258, 2020 WL 6047232, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020) (“[T]he Court holds
that the filing of an information without an accompanying waiver is sufficient to
toll the statute of limitations—even though it may not be effective for other purposes”).
175
See, e.g., United States v. Sanfilippo, No. 21-60006-CR-ALTMAN, 2021
WL 5414945 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2021); United States v. Webster, 2021 WL
4952572, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2021); United States v. Xavier, No. 20-cr80054, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2021); United States v. Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1289
(S.D. Fla. 2021); B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063.
173
174
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IV.

THE JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO
THE PANDEMIC RIDDLE IN FLORIDA
In the District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
prosecutors charged multiple cases that had expiring limitations periods under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) via an information during the eightmonth COVID-19 grand jury suspension, and, as a result, the issue
of what “instituted” means is being litigated in that court. 176 In several of those cases, the defendants, after the statute of limitations
expired, stated that they would not waive their right to prosecution
by indictment, meaning the cases could not be adjudicated on an
information. 177 Those defendants then either opposed the prosecutors’ requests to dismiss their informations under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48(a) for failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(b) 178 or moved to dismiss the subsequent indictments as untimely. 179 The defendants’ arguments hinged on
reading “instituted” in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) and “failure to file” in
18 U.S.C. §§ 3288 and 3289 as requiring both the filing of the information and either the defendant’s entrance of a waiver of prosecution by indictment compliant with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) or, if the defendant did not enter such a waiver, the return
of an indictment within the five-year limitations period proscribed
by 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 180
A.
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Judges Split on Whether Filing an Information Tolls the Statute of
Limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
At the time this article was published, four District Court for the
Southern District of Florida judges had addressed whether filing an
information with the district court “instituted” it under 18 U.S.C.

See, e.g., Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945, at *3; Webster, 2021 WL 4952572
at *2; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1283; B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12.
177
See supra note 176.
178
See B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12.
179
See, e.g., Webster, 2021 WL 4952572 at *2; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at
1292.
180
See, e.g., Webster, 2021 WL 4952572 at *2; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at
1292–93.
176
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§ 3282(a), and thus tolls the limitations period. 181 Three judges held
that filing an information with the district court institutes it,182 but
one judge disagreed, holding that “instituted” requires both that the
information be filed and that the defendant enter a waiver of prosecution by indictment compliant with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b). 183
On January 11, 2021, in United States v. B.G.G., Judge Middlebrooks was the first District Court for the Southern District of Florida judge to evaluate whether prosecutors can toll the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) by filing an information. 184 The prosecutors filed an information with the district court just before the
statute of limitations expired, the defendant stated that he would not
waive his right to prosecution by indictment after the limitations period expired, and the prosecutors moved to dismiss the information
without prejudice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a). 185 Judge Middlebrooks denied the prosecutors’ Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion and, instead, dismissed the information with prejudice based on his conclusion that the charges
alleged therein were untimely because the statute of limitations expired before either the defendant waived prosecution by indictment
or the grand jury returned an indictment. 186 Specifically, Judge Middlebrooks held, based on his interpretation of the legislative history
of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), that filing an information was not sufficient
to institute it because that information could not support a prosecution. 187 Instead, Judge Middlebrooks held “instituted” required both
that the information was filed and also that the court could render an
adjudication upon that information, meaning that the statute of limitations was not tolled until the defendant entered a waiver of prosecution by indictment as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b). 188
181
See Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945 at *3; Webster, 2021 WL 4952572 at
*2; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1283; B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12.
182
See, e.g., Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945 at *8; Webster, 2021 WL 4952572
at *4; Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1293.
183
B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12.
184
Id. at 9.
185
Id. at 2.
186
Id. at 12.
187
Id. at 12–19.
188
Id.
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Judge Middlebrooks acknowledged that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and at least six federal district
courts had contrarily held that, under the plain language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a), filing an information institutes it, but he declined to adopt
the reasoning in those cases because he believed that it was inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 to recognize an invalid charging document as a mere mechanism for extending a statute of limitations period where that document could not initiate criminal proceedings on the charges contained therein or confer subject matter jurisdiction. 189
Judge Middlebrooks concluded:
I appreciate that the historical moment we are living
through, which gave rise to the temporary suspension
of grand juries, prevented the Government from obtaining indictments in this District from approximately March 26, 2020 to November 17, 2020. But
our legal system has experienced public emergencies
before, and it will experience them again. Allowing
the applicability of our constitutional norms to ebb
and flow with the times is not becoming of a democracy under the rule of law. Indeed, if our laws are to
carry any force, they must stand despite the trials and
tribulations of society. Congress can certainly make
exceptions; however, it has not done so here. In fact,
in March of 2020 when the Department of Justice
asked it to suspend criminal statutes of limitations
during the coronavirus pandemic and for one year
thereafter, Congress declined to make such a special
dispensation. 190
The prosecutors appealed that determination to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on January 14, 2021. At
the time of this article’s publication, that appeal remains pending.191
On March 17, 2021, Judge Ruiz issued a contrary order in
United States v. Rosecan, holding that an information is “instituted”
189
190
191

Id. at 10–14.
Id. at 19.
United States v. B.G.G., No. 21-10165 (11th Cir. 2021).
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and tolls the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) when it is
filed with the district court. 192 Judge Ruiz reasoned that, under the
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), the statute of limitations is
tolled when an information is filed and that nothing more, including
the defendant’s entry of a waiver of prosecution by indictment in
compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), is required. 193 Judge Ruiz disagreed with Judge Middlebrooks, explaining that Judge Middlebrooks’ ruling “appears to depart from a plain
reading of section 3282 and instead divines the meaning of the statute through a survey of legislative history,” which Judge Ruiz believed was unnecessary and improper given the plain and unambiguous text used by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3282.194
Judge Middlebrooks, however, was unconvinced, and, on September 8, 2021, he again rejected the argument that filing an information tolls the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) in
United States v. Xavier. 195 The procedural posture of Xavier was
different than that of B.G.G. 196 In Xavier, neither the prosecutors nor
the defendant moved to dismiss the information under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a). 197 Instead, the prosecutors left the information, which was filed on June 29, 2020, in place until grand
juries resumed meeting in late November 2020. 198 Then, on December 8, 2020, the prosecutors brought the same charges before a grand
jury, which found a superseding indictment against Xavier. 199 Xavier moved to dismiss the superseding indictment as untimely, arguing that the filing of the information did not institute it and, thus, the
statute of limitations expired before the grand jury indicted him. 200
Judge Middlebrooks partially agreed, holding that filing the information did not institute it but finding that the superseding indictment
was timely because the COVID-19 pandemic equitably tolled the
192
193
194
195

2021).
196
197
198
199
200

United States v. Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1293–94 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
Id. at 1293–94.
Id. at 1294.
United States v. Xavier, No. 20-cr-80054, slip op. at 5–6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8,
Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.

976

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

statute of limitations.201 Judge Middlebrooks noted that he was the
first federal judge to equitably toll 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), and he explained that he took that extraordinary step because “[t]he pandemic
was unforeseeable and the impact has been unprecedented in terms
of the disruption to normal societal functioning. The court closure
in this district, including the suspension of federal grand juries, impeded the Government’s ability to seek a timely indictment.” 202
Later in September 2021, Judge Gayles weighed in, joining
Judge Ruiz when he adopted a report and recommendation issued
by Magistrate Judge Torres in United States v. Webster, holding that
filing an information tolls the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C.
3282(a). 203 That report and recommendation directly addressed the
split between Judge Middlebrooks and Judge Ruiz, explaining that
the plain statutory text took precedence over any inferences gleaned
from the legislative history. 204 The report and recommendation also
explained that the determination that an information is instituted
when it is filed is “supported by the central policy underlying the
statutes of limitations that focuses on giving a defendant fair notice
of the charges against him within a reasonable amount of time,”
which an information does when it is filed with the court. 205
Finally, on November 19, 2021, Judge Altman issued an extensive order in United States v. Sanfilippo, denying a motion to dismiss an indictment as untimely and agreeing with Judge Ruiz and
Judge Gayles that filing an information institutes it, although Judge
Altman based that conclusion on both the plain meaning and the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 206 First, Judge Altman held
that an information is instituted when it is filed with the district court
because that is all that the plain language of the 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
requires. 207 Judge Altman specified that “instituted” means
“caus[ing] to come into existence,” 208 whereas “prosecuted” means
“[t]o institute and pursue a criminal action against (a person.)”209
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 5–8.
Id. at 7–8.
Webster, 2021 WL 4952572, at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945, at *3.
Id.
Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993).
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
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Thus, he concluded, because an information comes into existence
when it is filed, an information is instituted when it is filed. 210 Judge
Altman also explained, contrary to the conclusion reached by Judge
Middlebrooks in B.G.G., that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a) demonstrated that, from 1790 through the present, Congress intended “instituted” to require nothing more than the filing of
the information with the district court. 211 Judge Altman explained
that Congress had amended 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) four times since
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) was enacted and once since
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
filing an information instituted it, yet it elected in each instance “not
to alter, amend, or delete the phrase ‘information is instituted’ in any
way.” 212 Accordingly, Judge Altman concluded, Congress was clear
by 2003, when it last amended 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), that a prosecutor filing an information, not a defendant entering a waiver of prosecution by indictment, is what tolls the statute of limitations. 213
B.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Could Be the First Post-Pandemic Appellate Court to Evaluate the
Proposed Solution
As is evident from the split between the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida judges, what “the information is instituted” means in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) is an open question of law in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Indeed,
the only United States Court of Appeals to answer that question—
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit—did so
in a short opinion over twenty years ago, 214 which has only been
210

Id.
Id. at *6–8.
212
Id. at *7.
213
Id.
214
United States v. Burdix-Dana, 149 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that, while Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires a waiver of prosecution by indictment before the charges can be adjudicated, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(b) does not forbid the filing of an information without a
waiver, stating simply “[t]here is nothing in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C.
§3282 that suggests a prosecution must be instituted before the expiration of the
five year period; instead the statute states that the information must be instituted”).
Although the Tenth Circuit has referenced Burdix-Dana as persuasive reasoning
211
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considered, and either adopted or rejected, by fourteen federal district court judges in the ensuing time. 215 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit could confront this issue in 2022
when it decides the appeal that the United States took from Judge
in another context, it has yet to hold that filing a waiverless information tolls the
statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). United States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d
1244, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 2002).
215
In addition, to the above-described four District Court for the Southern
District of Florida judges, nine other federal district court judges have adopted
Burdix-Dana and held that filing an information tolls the statute of limitations in
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). See United States v. Rothenberg, No. 20-CR-00266, 2021
WL 4704583, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021); United States v. Kruse, No. 20CR-249, slip op. at 4–6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2020); United States v. Dixon, No.
20-cr-00006 (W .D. Va. Oct. 26, 2020); United States v. Holmes, 2020 WL
6047232, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020); United States v. Briscoe, No. CR-RDB20-0139, 2020 WL 5076053, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2020); United States v.
Marifat, No. 17-0189, 2018 WL 1806690, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2018);
United States v. Stewart, 425 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734–35 (E.D.Va. 2006); HsinYung, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 28; Watson, 941 F. Supp. at 603. Two federal district
court judges have held that filing an information does not toll the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), and, instead, held that the defendant’s entry of a
waiver of prosecution by indictment tolls the statute of limitations. See United
States v. Sharma, No. 4:14-CR-61, 2016 WL 292365 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2016);
United States v. Machado, No. CRIM.A.04–10232, 2005 WL 2886213 (D. Mass.
Nov. 3, 2005). In both cases, the information was sealed until after the limitations
period expired. Machado, 2005 WL 2886213 at *5; Sharma, 2016 WL 292365 at
*4 In addition, Machado’s reasoning was largely premised on an error of law.
Machado, 2005 WL 2886213 at *2. Specifically, Machado reasoned that filing an
information could not toll the statute of limitations because an information filed
without a waiver of prosecution by indictment did not confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts. Id. Machado made that jurisdictional determination based on a
1991 district court order and a 1965 opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which both stated that a federal court has no jurisdiction until a defendant enters a waiver of prosecution by indictment. Id. After the
Supreme Court decided Cotton in 2002 and Kontrick in 2004, which respectively
held that all that is required to create federal subject matter jurisdiction is a charging document that alleges an offense against the law of the United States and that
court-proscribed rules such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
affect federal jurisdiction, those two cases are no longer good law. See Daughenbaugh, 549 F.3d at 1012 (holding that “absence of a waiver of indictment is a
nonjurisdictional defect” under Cotton and Kontrick); See generally United States
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004). Simply
put, there are large cracks in the foundation on which Machado’s nearly 20-yearold holding sits.

2022]

HIDING IN PLAIN LANGUAGE

979

Middlebrooks’ order dismissing the information with prejudice in
B.G.G. 216
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
heard oral argument in B.G.G. on January 14, 2022. 217 Although the
issue of what “instituted,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), means is
raised in that appeal, the unique procedural posture of the case does
not require the Eleventh Circuit to address that issue. 218 Because the
prosecutors are appealing the denial of their Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion to dismiss the information without prejudice on multiple grounds, the Court could reverse the order on the
alternative ground that the district court exceeded its limited authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) when it denied
the motion based on an improper anticipatory analysis of the timeliness of a future indictment. 219 The resolution of the appeal in that
way, which would result in the dismissal of the information without
prejudice, would allow the prosecutors, under 18 U.S.C. § 3288, to
re-charge the case in an indictment within 60 days of any order of
dismissal resulting from the appeal becoming final. 220 If B.G.G.
moved to dismiss that indictment as untimely, then the district court
could resolve whether filing an information institutes it and, if it
does not, whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled by the
COVID-19 pandemic. 221 Or, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit could decide the appeal by reaching the merits
of the district court’s determination that any superseding indictment
would be futile because the statute of limitations had run on the
charges. 222
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will eventually be called upon to resolve the intra-district split
in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida over the
meaning of “instituted” in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), it is unclear whether
216
See generally United States v. B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 12 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 11, 2020).
217
United States v. B.G.G., CT. LISTENER (Jan. 14, 2022) https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/79444/united-states-v-bgg/.
218
United States v. B.G.G., No. 21-10165 (11th Cir. 2021).
219
B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 6.
220
18 U.S.C. § 3288.
221
See, e.g., United States v. Xavier, No. 20-cr-80054, slip op. at 6–7 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 8, 2021).
222
B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 5–6.
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that resolution will occur at the present procedural moment or in a
future appeal that raises the same issue at a different point during
the lifetime of a case, whether it be via an appeal from the final adjudication in Rosecan, 223 Webster, 224 Xavier, 225 or Sanfilippo,226 or
from a second appeal in B.G.G. 227 Whenever it occurs, that opinion
will affect federal prosecutions nationwide, both as the nation recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and during any future national
emergencies that could again require the suspension of grand juries.
CONCLUSION
Given the likelihood that a future national emergency—pandemic or otherwise—could again necessitate a grand jury suspension, and that Congress will again not grant authority to either the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court or the chief judges
of the United States District Courts to toll statutes of limitations during such emergencies, the judicial confirmation of a lawful procedure through which prosecutors can timely charge crimes without
grand juries in compliance with the Fifth Amendment using alreadyexisting legislation is critical. The solution proposed by this article
is authorized by the plain meaning of the unambiguous text of 18
U.S.C. § 3282(a), 228 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), 229
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288230 and 3289; 231 it furthers the differing purposes served by the statutes of limitations, the Fifth Amendment,232
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b); 233 and it is supported
by over 200 years of legislative history. 234 While no one could have
predicted the unprecedented years-long international public health
Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1293.
Webster, 2021 WL 4952572 at *2.
225
Xavier, No. 20-cr-80054, slip op. at 6–7.
226
Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945, at *3.
227
B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063, slip op. at 5-6.
228
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
229
FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
230
18 U.S.C § 3288.
231
18 U.S.C § 3289.
232
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
233
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
234
See, e.g., Dession, supra note 128, at 205; see also 134 Cong. Rec. 13660,
13785 (daily ed. June 8, 1988).
223
224
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crisis caused by COVID-19, the tools to adapt the American criminal justice system to operate in such an emergency, while still upholding this nation’s constitutional and statutory requirements, were
hiding in the plain language of already-existing legislation. It is a
surprisingly ordinary solution to a surprisingly extraordinary situation, and it is a solution that can be used far into the future in response to whatever unpredictable national emergencies may befall
the United States.

